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Born Rule and Logical Inference in Quantum Mechanics
Tsubasa Ichikawa
Mukogaoka 1-10-6-1004, Tokyo 113-0023, Japan
Logical inference leads to one of the major interpretations of probability theory called logical
interpretation, in which the probability is seen as a measure of the plausibility of a logical statement
under incomplete information. In this paper, assuming that our usual inference procedure makes
sense for every set of logical propositions represented in terms of commuting projectors on a given
Hilbert space, we extend the logical interpretation to quantum mechanics and derive the Born rule.
Our result implies that, from the epistemological viewpoints, we can regard quantum mechanics as
a natural extension of the classical probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Inference is one of the essential building blocks in vari-
ous branches of mathematical science: Jaynes’ derivation
of statistical mechanics [1, 2] is based on the inference
of the probability distribution most likely to reproduce
given expectations of thermodynamic variables. Since
the era of Laplace [3], probability has been more or less
regarded as a measure of likelihood of statements being
valid, although there coexists the interpretation that the
probability is nothing but the relative frequency.
The inference plays an important role even to under-
stand fundamental aspects of probability theory. The fol-
lowing is shown by Cox [4–6]: Suppose there is a measure
of the plausibility of statements being valid under incom-
plete information. If the measure follows inference rules
consistent with our common sense, then the measure sat-
isfies the product rule and the sum rule of the probabil-
ity, and hence it can be interpreted as the probability. In
other words, without invoking the notion of the relative
frequency, probability theory can be derived by assuming
reasonable inference rules under incomplete information.
This derivation is called Cox’s theorem, which allows us
to see the probability as a natural extension of the truth
values of the propositions. This interpretation of prob-
ability is called the logical interpretation of probability
[7].
Recently, several inference methods are becoming uti-
lized to reconstruct quantum mechanics. The equations
of motions such as the Schro¨dinger equation [8], the Pauli
equation [9], and the Klein-Gordon equation [10] are de-
rived under the auxiliary requirement that the plausi-
bility of the experimental outcomes is robust under the
slight changes of the experimental parameters. Wave
function and the Schro¨dinger equation are derived from
other auxiliary assumptions [11, 12].
In this paper, we show that the measure of the plau-
sibility takes the form of the Born rule by extending the
argument mentioned above to the Hilbert space and the
projectors thereof. Interestingly enough, for the com-
muting projectors, Lu¨ders rule of the conditional prob-
ability [13] is also derived. Analogously to the deriva-
tion of Cox’s theorem, throughout our discussion, we will
assume that the plausibility measures follow our stan-
dard inference procedures for commuting projectors. Our
derivation, hence, enables us to see both the rules as the
measures of plausibility on which our inference makes
sense for the commuting projectors.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
review two formulations of the probability theory. In Sec-
tion III, we present three approaches to interpretations of
the probability theory. One of those, Cox’s approach to
the logical interpretation on the basis of inference rules,
is studied in detail. In Section IV, we extend Cox’s ap-
proach in quantum mechanics. By this extension, we
derive the Lu¨ders rule for any pair of commuting pro-
jectors, which admits an ordering relation. Moreover,
we show that the Lu¨ders rule can be shown as the con-
ditional probability, even for non-commuting projectors.
In Section V, we give an example that the inference rule
employed in Cox’s approach is no longer valid for non-
commuting projectors. Section VI is devoted to conclu-
sion and discussions.
II. TWO FORMULATIONS OF PROBABILITY
THEORY
Probability and conditional probability are central no-
tions in the probability theory. Depending upon which
one we take as the more fundamental concept, we have
two formulations of the probability theory. In this sec-
tion, we give a brief review of them, since we need both
in the following argument.
Both the formulations are based on the σ-algebra,
which is defined as follows. Suppose we are given n mu-
tually different elements ω1, · · · , ωn. The set of all the
elements is denoted by Ω := {ω1, · · · , ωn}, and the sub-
set thereof is written by A,B, · · · . A set F of the subsets
A,B, · · · is called the σ-algebra if it satisfies
∅ ∈ F ,
A ∈ F ⇒ Ac ∈ F ,
A,B ∈ F ⇒ A ∩B ∈ F . (1)
Here ∅ stands for the empty set and Ac is the complement
of A defined through A ∩ Ac = ∅ and A ∪ Ac = Ω.
Let us turn to the two formulations mentioned above.
In the first one, which we hereafter call the probability-
based formulation, the probability is given first, and the
conditional probability is defined as the ratio thereof.
2More precisely, the probability Pr(A) is defined as a map
from F to [0, 1], which satisfies
Pr(A) ≥ 0 for ∀A ∈ F , (2a)
Pr(Ω) = 1, (2b)
Pr(A ∪B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B) if A ∩B = ∅. (2c)
and the conditional probability Pr(A|B) is given as
Pr(A|B) = Pr(A ∩B)
Pr(B)
, (3)
when Pr(B) 6= 0.
The second formulation [14–16], in contrast, is based
on the conditional probability. In this formulation, we
introduce the σ-algebra F and its non-empty subset G,
and define the conditional probability Pr(A|B) for A ∈ F
and B ∈ G as the non-negative map, which fulfills
Pr(B|B) = 1 for ∀B ∈ G, (4a)
Pr(A ∪B|C) = Pr(A|C) + Pr(B|C) (4b)
for A,B ∈ F and C ∈ G such that A ∩B = ∅, and
Pr(A|B) = Pr(A ∩B|C)
Pr(B|C) (4c)
forA ∈ F andB,C ∈ G such thatB ⊂ C and Pr(B|C) >
0.
The formulation based on Eqs. (4) is a natural exten-
sion of the probability-based formulation. It is shown in
[15] that the conditional probability Pr(A|B) in the sense
of Eq.(4) can be seen as the probability when B is fixed.
Thus, we utilize the notation Pr(A) to the special case
B = Ω, that is,
Pr(A) = Pr(A|Ω). (5)
Conversely, the conditional probability (3) satisfies
Eqs. (4). Note that not all the conditional probabilities
in the sense of Eqs. (4) take the form of Eq. (3).
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF PROBABILITY
To give the interpretations of the probability theory,
we construct a mathematical quantity which is easy to
understand intuitively and fulfills the conditions (2) or
(4), depending on which formulation we take. Here we
take three examples of well-known interpretations of the
probability [17].
Frequency Interpretation. First, let us show that the
relative frequency of the events occurring satisfies the
conditions (2). Consider a coin flipping game, whose
possible outcomes are either finding the head (H) or the
tail (T) of the coin. Thus, we have Ω = {H,T} and
F = {∅, {H}, {T},Ω}. Note that Ω = {H} ∪ {T} and
{H}∩{T} = ∅. Now we repeat the coin flipping game N
times and write the number of finding H as NH and that
of finding T as NT, respectively. The relative frequency
of finding H is NH/N and that of finding T is NT/N . By
setting Pr(∅) = 0, Pr({H}) = NH/N , Pr({T}) = NT/N ,
and Pr(Ω) = 1, we find
Pr(Ω) = Pr({H} ∪ {T}) = Pr({H}) + Pr({T}) = 1,(6)
which shows that the relative frequency satisfies the con-
ditions (2). This is the reason why we may interpret the
probability as relative frequency.
In the frequency interpretation, we need a well-defined
ensemble of the repeatable events to define the probabil-
ity distributions. On the other hand, it has been pointed
out that the frequency interpretation is not applicable to
one-shot event or the measurement of physical constants
[18, 19]. The following two interpretations provide useful
tools for the analyses of such cases.
Subjective Interpretation. The second example is
Dutch Book argument (DBA) [20]. In DBA, we consider
a bet on whether a given hypothesis (it rains tomorrow,
for example) is true. If the hypothesis is true, then the
bettor obtains the stake S. If it is not the case, he obtains
nothing. Let us now suppose that the bettor pays the wa-
ger qS, where q is called the betting quotient. Then the
net payoff of the bet is S − qS if the hypothesis is true,
and −qS otherwise.
In [20], de Finetti showed that the bookie can construct
a set of the bets in such a way that the bettor always get
the net loss, if the set of the betting quotients does not
obey the conditions (2): the fair betting quotients can be
seen as the probability. See [21] for the proof.
DBA leads to the subjective interpretation of the prob-
ability, since the betting quotients indicates how much
the bettor feels the hypotheses true. The salient feature
of DBA is that the bettor can freely determine his own
betting quotients: In a bet, it is not necessary that all
the participants of the bets have the same betting quo-
tients. This implies that in the subjective interpretation
we may assign several differenct probabilities (degree of
belief) for the plausibility of a hypothesis by our own
decision.
Logical Interpretation. The third example is the de-
gree of the plausibility of a given proposition conditioned
by the prior information [4–6], which is the central issue
of this paper.
Once the plausibility agrees with the conditions (4),
the conditional probability is seen as a natural extension
of the truth value of the proposition under uncertainty.
In what follows, the Boolean operations play an im-
portant role, since they characterize the relations among
the (composite) propositions made through the logical
operations. Given the truth values of the several propo-
sitions, we can find the truth values of the propositions
associated with them by the Boolean operations. Since
we will make the argument to see the conditional proba-
bility as an extension of the truth value, we shall provide
a discussion on the Boolean algebra below.
First, let us show that the σ-algebra F = {A,B,C . . . }
mentioned earlier is closed under the Boolean operations
AND (∧), OR (∨), and NOT (¬). This implies that
3we may establish the logic on the σ-algebra, because the
Boolean operation represents the relation among the log-
ical propositions.
To this end, we introduce the Boolean operations by
A ∧B := A ∩B, A ∨B := A ∪B, ¬A := Ac. (7)
We then clearly see the following properties, that is,
1. Idempotence
A ∧ A = A ∨A = A ∈ F . (8)
2. Commutativity
A ∧B = B ∧ A ∈ F , A ∨B = B ∨A ∈ F . (9)
3. Associativity
A ∧ (B ∧ C) = (A ∧B) ∧ C = A ∧B ∧ C ∈ F , (10a)
A ∨ (B ∨ C) = (A ∨B) ∨ C = A ∨B ∨ C ∈ F . (10b)
4. Distributivity
A ∧ (B ∨ C) = (A ∧B) ∨ (A ∧ C) ∈ F , (11a)
A ∨ (B ∧ C) = (A ∨B) ∧ (A ∨ C) ∈ F . (11b)
5. Duality
C = A ∧B ∈ F ⇒ ¬C = ¬A ∨ ¬B ∈ F , (12a)
C = A ∨B ∈ F ⇒ ¬C = ¬A ∧ ¬B ∈ F . (12b)
Since these properties define the Boolean algebra, the
σ-algebra is found to be closed under the Boolean opera-
tions. On the basis of this observation, we may safely re-
gard the element ωi as an elementary proposition, which
could be true or false. The subsets A,B, · · · ∈ F are
therefore the set of the composite propositions made by
the Boolean operations, and the set Ω is seen as the set
of all these.
We then formally introduce the measure of conditional
plausibility, denoted by A|B ∈ R, whose value quantifies
the degree of plausibility that A is true, given B is true.
We hereafter show that A|B satisfies the conditions (4)
under reasonable assumptions given below.
Following [4, 5, 22, 23], we put two assumptions on
A|B. They are mathematical expressions of our usual in-
ference procedures. The first assumption is the following:
Assumption 1 Given the propositions A,B,C, there
exists a continuous function F (x, y), which is strictly in-
creasing in both the arguments, and satisfies
A ∧B|C = F (B|C, A|B ∧ C). (13)
The assumption 1 implies that the plausibility of the
composite proposition A∧B given C is true is related to
two plausibilities and we infer the plausibility of A∧B|C
from successive inferences of B|C and A|B ∧ C. From
this assumption, by using the properties of the Boolean
algebra, Cox found that the function F (x, y) satisfies
F (F (x, y), z) = F (x, F (y, z)), (14)
and therefore takes the form of
F (x, y) = w−1 [w(x)w(y)] , 0 ≤ w(x) ≤ 1, (15)
where w(x) is a continuous, strictly increasing, non-
negative function to [0, 1]. Note that Eq. (15) reads
w(A ∧B|C) = w(B|C)w(A|B ∧C), (16)
which is an expression of the inference rule (13) in terms
of w(P |Q).
Further, we make the following assumption on w(x):
Assumption 2 There exists a continuous, strictly de-
creasing function S(x) such that
w(A|B) = S(w(¬A|B)). (17)
The assumption 2 means that the plausibility of a given
proposition can be inferred from that of its negation. Cox
found that Eq. (17) yields
S(x) = (1− xm) 1m , (18)
where m is a positive finite constant. Now we set m = 1
to obtain
w(A|B) + w(¬A|B) = 1. (19)
Eqs. (16) and (19) suffice to show that the conditional
plausibility w(A|B) satisfies Eqs. (4). To show these, we
need
w(A ∨B|C) = w(A|C) + w(B|C) − w(A ∧B|C),
(20)
whose proof is given in the Appendix.
We first prove Eq. (4c). Suppose B ⊂ C, which leads
to B ∧ C = B. Then it follows from Eq. (16) that
w(A ∧B|C) = w(A|B)w(B|C), (21)
which reduces to Eq. (4c) when w(B|C) 6= 0.
Furthermore, by setting A = B = C in Eq. (21), we
find w(A|A)2 = w(A|A), whose solutions are either 1 or
0. Therefore we obtain Eq. (4a) by taking the solution
w(A|A) = 1 and replacing A with B.
Now we proceed to prove Eq. (4b). Substituting Ω to
A in Eq. (16), we find
w(Ω ∧B|C) = w(Ω|C)w(B|Ω ∧C). (22)
Since Ω ∧B = B and Ω ∧ C = C, Eq. (22) turns to
w(Ω|C) = 1. (23)
4Furthermore, putting A = Ω in Eq. (19), we find
w(∅|C) = 0. (24)
Hence, from Eq. (20), we obtain
w(A ∨B|C) = w(A|C) + w(B|C) if A ∧B = ∅,
(25)
which shows Eq. (4b). The above argument guarantees
that we may put
Pr(A|B) = w(A|B), (26)
meaning that the degree of the plausibility can be seen
as the conditional probability.
Note that we have not used the repeatability or fre-
quency in the above argument. From the viewpoint of
the logical interpretation, thus, we are allowed to ap-
ply the probability theory to not necessarily repeatable
events.
IV. QUANTUM EXTENSION
In the following, we extend the preceding argument to
quantum mechanics. Let H = Cd be a finite dimensional
Hilbert space, and P,Q, · · · be the projectors acting on
H. The set of all the projectors is denoted by L(H). The
range of P is denoted by P (H). Note that P (H) is also
the Hilbert space.
Since the eigenvalues of the projectors are either 1 or
0, the eigenvalues can be seen as the truth values, and
hence every projector can be thought of as a proposition.
Analogously to A|B in the preceding section, let us
now introduce P |Q ∈ R as the degree of the plausibility
for the proposition P , given Q is true. We suppose that
P |Q are well-defined for all the pairs of the projectors,
even for those which do not necessarily commute.
Given the propositions P and Q, the composite pro-
jectors P ∧Q and P ∨Q are defined as the projectors to
the join and meet of P (H) and Q(H), respectively. The
negation ¬P is the projector on the orthogonal comple-
ment of P (H), which is hereafter denoted by P (H)⊥.
We shall show that P |Q is the natural extension of
the conditional probability and its concrete expression is
given by the Lu¨ders rule. For this pourpose, we need to
construct a Boolean subalgebra in a set of commuting
projectors. When P and Q commute with each other,
we have the explicit expressions of the logical operations
by associating them with corresponding projectors:
P ∧Q = PQ, P ∨Q = P +Q − PQ, ¬P = 1 − P,
(27)
where 1 is the identity operator. Note that P∨Q = P+Q
if P and Q are mutually orthogonal.
Similarly to Eqs. (1), we can define a set C of commu-
tative operators such that
0 ∈ C,
P ∈ C ⇒ ¬P ∈ C,
P,Q ∈ C ⇒ P ∧Q ∈ C. (28)
It is clear that the elements in C satisfies the properties
(8), (9), (10), (11), (12). Hence the set C is found to be
a Boolean subalgebra.
Three remarks are in order. First, 0, 1 in C corre-
spond to ∅, Ω in F , respectively. Second, the set C
is not unique: we can find infinitely many sets satisfy-
ing (28). Indeed, given a projector P , we can construct
C = {0, P,¬P, 1 }, implying that any projector is an ele-
ment of some Boolean subalgebra C. Third, the join of
all C gives L(H).
We now extend the definition of the conditional proba-
bility (4) to quantum mechanics: The non-negative func-
tion Pr(P |Q) of the projectors P ∈ L(H) and Q ∈ K,
where K is a non-empty subset of L(H), is the condi-
tional probability if it satisfies
Pr(Q|Q) = 1 for ∀Q ∈ K, (29a)
Pr(P ∨Q|R) = Pr(P |R) + Pr(P |R) (29b)
for P,Q ∈ L(H) and R ∈ K such that PQ = 0, and
Pr(P ∧Q|Q) = Pr(P ∧Q|R)
Pr(Q|R) (29c)
for P ∈ L(H) and Q,R ∈ K such that Q < R and
Pr(Q|R) > 0. Here, Q < R means that Q(H) ⊂ R(H),
which leads to Q = QR = RQ [24].
The formal replacement of the sets A,B,C to the pro-
jectors P,Q,R in Eq. (4c) is insufficient to define the
conditional probability in quantum mechanics, since such
replacement overlooks the non-commutativity among the
propositions. In other words, Pr(P ∧ Q|Q) = Pr(P |Q)
does not always hold in quantum mechanics, whereas its
classical counterpart Pr(A∧B|B) = Pr(A|B) always does
by setting B = C in Eq. (4c) [15].
The physical implication of Pr(P ∧ Q|Q) 6= Pr(P |Q)
is clear in the following example: let us take P as the
proposition that the momentum of a given particle has
the definite value, say p, and take Q as the other propo-
sition that its position has the definite value q. On the
one hand, then, P ∧ Q is the proposition that the par-
ticle has the definite values of the position and momen-
tum simultaneously, implying Pr(P ∧ Q|Q) = 0 due to
the uncertainty relation. On the other hand, Pr(P |Q)
may have the non-zero value, since the position eigen-
state could yield the definite value p in the momentum
measurement.
To proceed, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 3 Given the propositions P,Q,R, there ex-
ists a continuous, function G(x, y) ∈ R, which is strictly
increasing in both the arguments, and satisfies
P ∧Q|R = G(Q|R, P |Q ∧R) (30)
for P,Q,R ∈ C.
The function G(x, y) ensures the validity of our infer-
ence on the composite proposition P |Q given R, if they
constitute the Boolean subalgebra C. Conversely, if the
5propositions do not commute, then our inference does
not necessarily hold, as shown in the section V.
Now we prove
Lemma 1 There exists a continuous, strictly increasing,
non-negative function w(x) to [0, 1], which satisfies
w(P ∧Q|R) = w(Q|R)w(P |Q ∧R) (31)
for P,Q,R ∈ C.
Proof. From Eq. (30), we may employ the discussion in
the previous section in a given C, and find a continuous,
strictly increasing, non-negative function wC(x) such that
wC(P ∧Q|R) = wC(Q|R)wC(P |Q ∧R) (32)
for P,Q,R ∈ C. Then, given two Boolean subalgebra C
and C′ having the non-vanishing intersection C ∩ C′, we
find
wC(P |Q) = wC′(P |Q) (33)
for P,Q ∈ C∩C′, suggesting that wC(x) is independent of
C. Hence we may write wC(x) as w(x), which completes
the proof.
From the lemma 1, we immediately find
Lemma 2 The continuous, strictly increasing, non-
negative function w(x) to [0, 1] can be taken in a way
that it satisfies Eq. (29a).
Proof. By setting P = Q = R in Eq. (31), we find
w(Q|Q) = 0, 1. Thus Eq. (29a) is satisfied if we take the
solution w(Q|Q) = 1.
By finding the function w(x), we safely put the next
assumption:
Assumption 4 There exists a continuous, strictly de-
creasing function T (x) such that
w(P |Q) = T (w(¬P |Q)) (34)
for P,Q ∈ C.
This assumption leads to
Lemma 3 The continuous, strictly decreasing function
T (x) can be taken as
T (x) = 1− x. (35)
Proof. Similarly to the lemma 1, we utilize the argument
in the previous section. Then, in a given C, we obtain
T (x) = (1− xm) 1m , (36)
where m, being a positive finite constant, may be depen-
dent of C.
We now suppose that we are given two Boolean subalge-
bra C and C′ having the non-vanishing intersection C∩C′.
On this intersection, we find
[1 − w(¬P |Q)m] 1m = [1− w(¬P |Q)m′ ] 1m′ , (37)
for P,Q ∈ C ∩ C′, suggesting that m = m′. By setting
m = 1, we arrive at Eq. (35).
It follows from Eqs. (31) and (35) that
w(P ∨Q|R) = w(P |R) + w(Q|R), (38)
for P,Q,R ∈ C such that PQ = 0. This shows that
w(P |Q) is a probability measure for every C, if R is fixed.
Moreover, by fixing R and taking into account all the sets
C having R as its element, we easily find that Eq. (38)
holds for all P,Q such that [P,R] = [Q,R] = PQ = 0 for
the fixed R. Note that PQ = 0 implies [P,Q] = 0.
We prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4 If dimQ(H) ≥ 3, w(P |Q) takes the form of
w(P |Q) = tr(QρQP )
tr(ρQ)
(39)
for all P such that P ≤ Q.
Proof. Let us note that [P,R] = 0 is the necessary
condition of P ≤ R. Therefore Eq. (38) holds for all
P,Q such that PQ = 0 and P ≤ R, Q ≤ R for the
fixed R. Furthermore, by noticing that R behaves like
the identity operator on R(H) due to the idempotence
R2 = R, we observe that Eq. (38) can be seen as the
sufficient condition of the Gleason theorem [25], as far as
we consider the set of the projectors {P |P ≤ R}.
On the basis of the above argument, we may employ
the Gleason theorem, and hence obtain
w(P |Q) = tr(ρQP ). (40)
for P ≤ Q, if dimQ(H) ≥ 3. Here ρQ is a density matrix
which is dependent onQ. Since Q ≤ Q, we can set P = Q
to observe that
w(Q|Q) = tr(ρQQ) = 1 (41)
from Eq. (29a). Now it is clear that the density matrix
ρQ has the non-trivial support only on the eigenspace of
Q. Hence, with an appropriate density matrix ρ, we can
write
ρQ =
QρQ
tr(ρQ)
. (42)
Plugging Eq. (42) into Eq. (40), we find Eq. (39), which
completes the proof.
Equation (39) takes the form of the Lu¨ders rule of
conditional probability [13], even though its domain is
restricted by the projector ordering P ≤ Q. Moreover,
Eqs. (29b) and (29c) has not yet been proven. We here-
after relax the restriction on the projectors and show that
Eq. (39) fulfills Eqs. (29b) and (29c) as follows:
Lemma 5 The equation (39) satisfies Eq. (29b) for
P,Q ∈ L(H) and R ∈ K such that PQ = 0.
Proof. This is shown by the direct calculation.
6Lemma 6 The function w(P |Q) satisfies Eq. (29c).
Proof. From Eq. (39), we observe
w(P ∧Q|R)
w(Q|R) =
tr[(P ∧Q)RρR]
tr(QRρR)
. (43)
Since Q < R, we have Q = QR = RQ, which reduces the
denominator of the right hand side of Eq. (43) to
tr(QRρR) = tr(QρR) = tr(ρRQ) = tr(ρQ). (44)
Similarly, we have P ∧Q < Q, since (P ∧Q)(H) ⊂ Q(H).
Thus, by the same fashion as Eq. (44), we obtain
tr[(P ∧Q)RρR] = tr[(P ∧Q)QRρR]
= tr[(P ∧Q)QρR]
= tr[QρR(P ∧Q)]
= tr[QρRQ(P ∧Q)]
= tr[QρQ(P ∧Q)]. (45)
By plugging Eq. (44) and (45) into Eq. (43), we obtain
Eq. (29c), which completes the proof.
Summing up all the lemmata, we clearly observe
Theorem 1 If the assumption 3 and 4 hold, then the
conditional probability takes the form of
Pr(P |Q) = tr(QρQP )
tr(ρQ)
. (46)
Proof. It follows from the lemma 2, 5, and 6 that the
function w(P |Q) satisfies Eqs. (29). Thus, we may put
Pr(P |Q) = w(P |Q). We then find Eq. (46) from the
lemma 4.
Thus we have arrived at the Lu¨ders rule as the condi-
tional probability for all the projectors, by starting from
the degrees of the plausibility with the inference rules
valid at least in any C.
It is now straightforward to derive the Born rule:
Corollary 1 The probability to find the proposition P
being true is given by the Born rule:
Pr(P ) = tr(ρP ). (47)
Proof. We set Q = 1 in Eq. (46). Then we can make
use of the theorem 1 and obtain
Pr(P ) = Pr(P |1 ) = tr(ρP ), (48)
which proves the corollary.
Since the identity operator 1 corresponds to Ω, this
corollary shows that we can regard the Born rule as the
degree of the plausibility of the proposition P under no
information.
V. VIOLATION OF THE INFERENCE RULE
In the previous section, we have derived the Lu¨ders rule
by assuming the validity of the inference rules (16) and
(19) for any set C. This suggests that the inference rules
do not necessarily hold for non-commuting projectors.
Let us construct an example to show the violation of
the inference rule (16). We introduce
∆ = Pr(P ∧Q|R)− Pr(P |R) Pr(Q|P ∧R). (49)
and check its behavior. If ∆ = 0, then the inference rule
(16) holds. Now we set H = C2⊗2 and
P = | ↑〉〈↑ | ⊗ 1 2, Q = 1 2 ⊗ | ↑〉〈↑ |,
R = 1 2 ⊗ | →〉〈→ |, (50)
where 1 2 stands for the identity operator on C
2. We have
defined | ↑〉 = ( 1
0
), | ↓〉 = ( 0
1
), and | →〉 = 1√
2
( 1
1
). Note
that [P,Q] = [P,R] = 0, but [Q,R] 6= 0.
Furthermore, let us set
ρ =
r
4
1⊗2
2
+ (1 − r)| ↑〉〈↑ |⊗2, 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, (51)
which is a mixture of the completely mixed state and a
pure separable state. We then find
∆ =
√
2− 1
2
(r − 1). (52)
Thus, the inference rule (16) no longer holds except the
completely mixed case r = 1 and has the maximal vi-
olation when the state is completely pure r = 0. To
conclude, the conditional probability (39) does not obey
our inference rule (16) for the non-commuting projectors
except the completely mixed case.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
We obtained the Born rule and the Lu¨ders rule through
the simple and natural generalization of the logical inter-
pretation of the probability theory. We need not think
of both the rules as postulates, but as theorems deduced
from the reasonable assumption that our inference makes
sense for any set of the commuting projectors.
Whereas the inference rules hold for any C by the as-
sumptions, it does not hold for non-commuting projec-
tors. This property of the Lu¨ders rule is analogous to the
algebraic property of the observables appearing in Mer-
min’s magic square [26]: Given a set of non-commuting
observables, subsets of the commuting observables follow
the algebraic relations of their eigenvalues, but it is not
the case for the total set of the non-commuting observ-
ables. We could say that the validity of our inference
rules depends on the context. This property has been
overlooked in [27], where the Born rule has been alge-
braically derived by using the associativity relation of
the composite proposition (P ∨Q) ∨R = P ∨ (Q ∨R) =
P ∨Q ∨R for mutually orthogonal projectors P,Q,R.
7The results we have obtained could give new insights
to quantum logic [28]. In the quantum logic, we can
show that (i) the projectors of the Hilbert space are seen
as representations of elements of the orthomodular lat-
tice, which governs the algebraic relations among quan-
tum propositions [29], and (ii) the probability measure
on the projectors is given by the Born rule (the Glea-
son theorem). Note that these outcomes are formal, and
suggest nothing about the interpretations of the quantum
probability.
In contrast, we have derived the Born rule on the as-
sumptions easy to understand as the inference rules in the
Boolean subalgebra. Thus, we may say that, on the basis
of the quantum logic, we have arrived at an interesting
and new viewpoint: the Born rule is the natural exten-
sion of the standard inference rules to the orthomodular
lattice structure.
We mention that the inference approach is one of the
conceptual foundations in machine learning [30]. In par-
ticular, various non-informative prior distributions such
as Jeffery’s prior are proposed on the line of thought of
the logical interpretation. Analogously, our results ob-
tained here may provide the conceptual bases of quan-
tum machine learning [31], which is a recent central issue
in quantum information theory [32].
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Appendix: Proof of Eq. (20)
To prove Eq. (20), we follow the argument given in [6].
By using Eqs. (12b), (16) and (17), we obtain
w(A ∨B|C) = 1− w(¬(A ∨B)|C)
= 1− w(¬A ∧ ¬B|C)
= 1− w(¬A|C)w(¬B|¬A ∧C)
= 1− w(¬A|C) [1− w(B|¬A ∧ C)]
= w(A|C) + w(¬A|C)w(B|¬A ∧C)
= w(A|C) + w(¬A ∧B|C)
= w(A|C) + w(B|C)w(¬A|B ∧ C)
= w(A|C) + w(B|C) [1− w(A|B ∧C)]
= w(A|C) + w(B|C) − w(A ∧B|C),
(A.1)
which completes the proof.
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